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Abstract
The effect of spatial structure has been proved very relevant in repeated games. In this work we propose an agent based
model where a fixed finite population of tagged agents play iteratively the Nash demand game in a regular lattice. The
model extends the multiagent bargaining model by Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] modifying the assumption of global
interaction. Each agent is endowed with a memory and plays the best reply against the opponent’s most frequent demand.
We focus our analysis on the transient dynamics of the system, studying by computer simulation the set of states in which
the system spends a considerable fraction of the time. The results show that all the possible persistent regimes in the global
interaction model can also be observed in this spatial version. We also find that the mesoscopic properties of the interaction
networks that the spatial distribution induces in the model have a significant impact on the diffusion of strategies, and can
lead to new persistent regimes different from those found in previous research. In particular, community structure in the
intratype interaction networks may cause that communities reach different persistent regimes as a consequence of the
hindering diffusion effect of fluctuating agents at their borders.
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Introduction
The role that norms play as regulator mechanisms of certain
aspects of social, economic and organizational behaviours has
been thoroughly studied in the social sciences [2,3]. Once a norm
has been established, it acts as a self-reinforcement mechanism of
behaviour. However, the emergence, diffusion and collapse of
social norms are, in general, exempt from explicit mechanisms of
control.
There are different kinds of norms depending on the type of
social interaction. Concretely, in the economics field, an important
research effort is focused on understanding the emergence of
norms that determine the property distribution in a community.
Thus, in contrast to the equity norm that leads to ‘‘distributive
justice’’ and fair division of goods in some communities, there is
also evidence of systematic persistence of discriminatory norms
that allocate different shares of a resource according to some
individual characteristic or group membership.
Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework to analyse
this type of norms formally. In particular, the Nash bargaining
game [4] is often used as a simple archetypical model of economic
interaction and good distribution. Succinctly, the two-player Nash
bargaining game consists of two players that have to divide a sum
of money among them. The payoff for each player is the amount
of money they asked for, but if the sum of the demands exceeds the
total, they both obtain nothing.
If the game is played repeatedly among an infinite population of
players that are randomly paired up and change their strategy
according to the replicator dynamics then, given a particular initial
condition, it is possible to compute the distribution of strategies in
the population over time [5]. Notwithstanding, the influence of
such assumptions has proved very relevant for the results of
evolutionary game models [6]. This is particularly relevant given
that such assumptions are not always easy to justify.
In 2001, Axtell, Epstein and Young [1] proposed an agent-
based model (henceforth AEY’s model) to understand the transient
and the asymptotic dynamics of the Nash demand game in a finite
population. They simplified the analysis considering just three
possible demands: low (L), medium (M) and high (H). They proved
that different self-reinforcing norms can emerge spontaneously.
These emergent norms may be completely different from one
another even though all the agents of the population have exactly
the same behavioural rule. Which particular norm appears first
depends on initial conditions and on purely accidental events, such
as the specific pair of agents that happened to be (randomly)
paired at a certain time.
To obtain these conclusions Axtell et al. conduct their analysis
in two parts. Initially they study the dynamics of a population of
indistinguishable agents with the capacity to store in their
memories the strategies played by their opponents in the last
encounters. Each agent uses this information to form an
expectation about her opponent’s strategy, assuming that the
probability of the next demand equals the relative frequency of the
remembered experiences in the last encounters. Given that belief,
each agent responds with a ‘‘noisy best reply’’, i.e. a best reply with
a small probability of selecting a random demand. One of the
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norms that can emerge in this setting is the so-called ‘‘equity
norm’’, i.e. a self-fulfilling situation where everyone expects the
others to demand M and, as a consequence, everyone demands M;
this behaviour, in turn, confirms the expectations that everyone
already has, thus closing a self-consistent loop. Axtell et al. point
out that the ‘‘equity norm’’ is the unique stochastically stable state
of the game (see Young [7,8] for a comprehensive analysis of the
required conditions to obtain this conclusion), but they also find
other persistent stable fractious states, in which players play
repeatedly L or H, but never M.
More interestingly, in the second part of their analysis, Axtell
et al. endow each individual agent with one of two possible tags
(which can be recognised by all, but has no initial meaning) and
with the ability to remember both the past behaviour of her
opponents and their tag. In this second setting, they find that a
new stable state can endogenously emerge, in addition to the ones
previously observed. In this new state, agents behave differently
within and outside their own tag group, so the state was naturally
labelled ‘‘segregation’’. The implications of Axtell et al.’s finding
are astonishing: a discriminatory norm in which property is
unequally distributed based on observable characteristics that are
initially meaningless, may not only emerge but even perpetuate for
long, as a consequence of the self-reinforcing nature of the
dynamics. These results are very suggestive from a social point of
view when we associate the concept of tag in the model with some
social or cultural trait such as race, gender or age, which may
condition people’s behaviour in human societies. Using the model
as reference, the emergence of a rich variety of collective outcomes
can be explained. An example would be the situation where a
divided underclass is oppressed by a unified elite: this would
correspond in the model to a state where the elite group
systematically plays H against the oppressed group (who responds
optimally playing L) and plays equitable (M) among themselves,
while the discriminated group is stuck in a fractious state. The
replicator dynamics embeds two important assumptions: infinite
populations (which is the hypothesis relaxed by Axtell et al. [1])
and random pairings. The assumption that pairings are random
can be understood as an abstraction of persistent bargaining
interaction with strangers. However, in some contexts this may be
unrealistic; agents may interact only with just a small number of
other agents with which they are in direct contact [9,10]. In those
cases the global interaction assumption can be removed and we
can analyze the effect of a given social or spatial structure.
Introducing structure in the population implies that the
probability of interaction between two agents depends on the
specific pair of agents. The structure of the population can be
usefully represented by means of a graph or network that describes
the interaction connectivity. Ohtsuki et al. [11,12] argue that in a
general case, the structure should be described by two graphs, one
representing the interaction of the game played and a second one
representing the interaction of the adoption or learning mecha-
nism. Usually both graphs are considered the same. The effect of
many different types of graphs in games has been investigated,
examples of which include the analysis of iterated 262 games such
as the Prisoner’s Dilemma on regular lattices [13–15], Erdos-
Renyi [15–17], small-world [15,18], scale-free [16,17,19–23] or
real networks [24,25], the analysis of the snowdrift game on
lattices [26,27], small-world [28,29] or scale-free [19–21]
networks, and n-person games such as public good games on
lattices [30–33] or the minority game on small world networks
[34,35] (some reviews can be found at [6,36,37]). In this article we
have extended the analysis of norm diffusion in a population
considering AEY’s model as a framework. We have studied the
influence of the topology on the results of the game. To this aim,
we have considered the spatial dimension of the game by
introducing a regular spatial structure. We have also modified
the original model by adding a new behavioural rule that requires
less cognitive abilities than those required in the original paper.
When agents use this behavioural rule, the segregation norm
emerges more frequently, and a richer space of solutions is
observed.
This work is organized as follows: first, we briefly explain the
extensions and modifications that we have performed on AEY’s
original model. Next, we describe the results that we have obtained
when agents are randomly assigned a tag. At the end of this section
we discuss some cases where several persistent regimes can
simultaneously emerge, and their relation with some mesoscopic
topological properties. We then finish with the conclusions of this
work.
Methods
Agent-based Model of Bargaining in a Regular Lattice
In this section we describe an agent-based model of bargaining
in regular lattices based on the original tag model proposed by
Axtell et al. [1]. Our model introduces a spatial restriction in the
structure of interactions: agents are embedded on a regular lattice
and they can only bargain with their spatial neighbours. In each
time period of the model, each agent selects one of her neighbours
at random to play the Nash demand game. When playing the
game, each agent considers three possible demands of a pie (which
is a metaphor of something that is going to be shared between two
persons), i.e. low (L) or 30%, medium (M) or 50% and high (H) or
70%. The agents get the chosen demand if the sum of their
demands does not exceed 100 percent of the pie; otherwise they
both get nothing (see the payoff matrix in the Table 1). The Nash
demand game represented in Table 1 has exactly three pure-
strategy Nash equilibria, corresponding to the pairs (L, H), (M, M),
and (H, L). These are called the equilibria of the one-shot
bargaining game.
As in Axtell et al. [1], the population of agents is divided into
two groups of equal size whose members share a recognizable
characteristic which has no a priori social meaning, i.e. a tag.
These tags are used by the agents to select their demand in the
one-shot game. To be precise, the agents’ decision rule, which is
identical for all individuals, is based on the agents’ capacity to
remember their opponent’s demand in the m most recent
interactions with opponents with the same tag (i.e. intratype
interaction) and the m most recent interactions with opponents
with the other tag (i.e. intertype interaction). These experiences
constitute the agent’s intratype and intertype memories. In the
AEY model, an individual chooses the best reply that maximizes
the expected demand considering their past experiences with
similar opponents, i.e. those with the same tag. In contrast, in our
model we consider a simpler decision rule, henceforth the mode
rule, which dictates that individuals choose the best reply against
the most frequent demand with similar opponents (ties are
Table 1. Payoff matrix of the Nash demand game.
H M L
H (0,0) (0,0) (70,30)
M (0,0) (50,50) (50,30)
L (30,70) (30,50) (30,30)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.t001
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resolved randomly without any bias). The mode rule is cognitively
less demanding than AEY’s and, naturally, it induces different
results than those obtained with the original rule [38].
The stochastic version of the game considers that agents may
make mistakes in their decisions (or simply experiment from time
to time). Hence, with probability (12e) an individual chooses the
best reply and with probability e she chooses one of the three
possible demands at random (low, medium or high with the same
probability).
The model has been implemented in Netlogo (http://ccl.
northwestern.edu/netlogo/) and can be downloaded at this url:
http://ingor.ubu.es/models/aeygrid).
We can summarize the model as follows: there is a population of
N agents randomly distributed in a regular 2-dimensional toroidal
lattice of LxL=N cells, each one inhabited by one and only one of
the N agents. The population is divided exactly into two groups
whose members have a distinctive tag. The number of agents is
chosen satisfying simultaneously two conditions: (1) it is even, so
the population can be divided exactly into two groups, (2) and its
square root is an integer, so the regular lattice is square too. Each
agent is endowed with two memories of length m to keep the
demands of the two classes of tags. Memories are initialized at
random. In each time period t, each agent randomly selects one of
her 8 neighbours (radius-1 Moore neighbourhood) to play the
game. The agent observes her opponent’s tag and decides the best
reply against the most frequent demand in her corresponding
memory (i.e. intratype or intertype). However, with a small
probability e an agent decides randomly between the three
possible demands. Afterwards both agents update their memories.
Figure 1 shows the different interaction networks of a particular
spatial distribution of tagged agents in a 464 lattice.
Results
Understanding the dynamics of the model
Before our computational exploration of the model, we have
conducted a brief analysis within the framework of Markov Chains
[39] to gain some insights about the expected dynamics and
behaviour of the model. Fortunately, some aspects of this formal
analysis have already been carried out for the AEY model by
Axtell et al [1], and for the evolutionary model of bargaining by
Young [7,8]. In terms of markovian properties, our model shares
many characteristics with these models. To represent the model as
a time-homogeneous Markov Chain (THMC), we define the state
Figure 1. Example of a spatial distribution and its corresponding interaction networks. The spatial distribution, depicted in the centre,
consists of 16 agents randomly distributed in a regular 2-dimensional toroidal lattice of 464 cells. The corresponding set of interaction networks are
shown in the corners: (i) the complete interaction network (upper left corner), (ii) the intertype interaction network (upper right corner), (iii) the ‘‘black
tag’’ intratype interaction network (bottom left corner), and (iv) the ‘‘white tag’’ intratype interaction network (bottom right corner).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g001
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of the system in a time period t as a N-dimensional vector
Xt = {X
1
t, X
2
t,…, X
N
t} of 2m-tuples X
i
t, each one corresponding
to agent i’s memory of both intratype and intertype encounters (it
is not necessary to use all m values of the agents’ memory to
represent the state space, since knowing only the memory length
and two of the frequencies of each possible demand {L,M,H} is
enough). Note that the spatial distribution of tags conditions the
chances of intratype/intertype encounters in each period, but the
possible changes that may occur in each interaction are only
dependent on the particular form of the two m-tuple memories
that are involved in the interaction.
The characteristics of the system dynamics are strongly
determined by the presence or absence of errors (mutations in
evolutionary terminology) in agents’ decisions. In the absence of
decision errors, i.e. the unperturbed model, the system has absorbing
states in which sooner or later it will be trapped (if we run the
model for long enough). These absorbing states are directly related
with the three pure-strategy Nash equilibria of the Nash demand
game, giving rise to the equity norm (EQ) and the inequity norm (IQ).
The former happens when everyone in the population expects the
others will demand M, and consequently everyone demands M, so
the system ends reaching an absorbing state for both intratype and
intertype bargaining processes, which is equitable because all
agents get equal payoffs, and is also efficient (in Pareto sense)
because no agent can be made better off without making another
agent worse off. Apart from this, in the AEY model without spatial
restrictions [1], there are also IQ absorbing states for the intertype
bargaining game. An IQ equilibrium corresponds to a state in
which tagged agents coordinate in one of the two asymmetric
pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Whenever agents of one tag expect
the others will demand L and hence they will demand H, and
simultaneously the others will expect and demand the comple-
mentary decisions, the system reaches an absorbing state, which in
this case is efficient but not equitable in the proportions obtained
by each agent.
Interestingly, additional absorbing states show up as a
consequence of the imposed spatial structure. For example, a
spatial distribution of 464 tagged agents like the one depicted in
Figure 2 allows an IQ absorbing state in both intratype bargaining
games, i.e black-black and white-white.
When randomness is introduced in agents’ decisions (motivated
by the possibility of mistakes or by a simple desire for exploration),
the system becomes ergodic. In this case, there is a unique limiting
distribution over the state space which determines the probability
of finding the system in each of its states in the long run (e.g.
limtR‘P(Xt = i)). Such probabilities are strictly positive and
independent of the initial conditions. This limiting distribution
can be estimated sampling just one simulation run for a sufficiently
long time, by computing the fraction of the time that the system
spends in each state, i.e. the occupancy distribution [39]. In
contrast to what one may expect, when the tagged model for a
finite population and global interaction is asymptotically analysed,
this limiting distribution concentrates only on one of the two
absorbing states of the unperturbed model, the EQ. The formal
demonstration of this relies on the concept of stochastic stability
[8]. When some small noise exists, the EQ state is stochastically
stable while IQs are not. This implies that, in the long run and for
sufficiently unlikely perturbations, the system tends to spend most
of the time at the EQ state. Nevertheless, Axtell et al. [1] make an
interesting contribution turning the attention from the asymptotic
to the transient dynamics, and showing that there are other
relevant states in which the system spends a considerable fraction
of the time, henceforth persistent regimes. In the transient evolution of
the global interaction model, sometimes the system is temporarily
trapped in a particular regime, called fractious regime (FR), in which
agents alternate their demands between H and L, making the
emergence of the equity norm very difficult (We keep the word
fractious for consistency with the original AEY’s model; but it may
be worth noting that other names, such as ‘‘fluctuating agents’’
[16,40], have been used in the literature for essentially the same
concept, i.e. agents that intermittently change their strategy).
Moreover, they show that the transition time between this
fractious regime FR to the stochastically stable state EQ can be
enormously long and this time grows exponentially with the
number of agents and their memory length -i.e in their
terminology: ergodicity is broken.
Formally, the system is completely characterised by the vector
Xt, which can be graphically represented using a 2-simplex of the
agents’ states (see Figure 3). Each of the two agent i’s memories
keeps track of the demands made by her opponents in the m most
recent intratype (or intertype) encounters, and can be represented
by a vector of the relative frequencies of these demands Xi = {nL/
m, nM/m, nH/m}, where nL denotes the number of times that
agent i’s opponent demanded L in the m most recent intratype (or
intertype) interactions. This vector corresponds in the simplex with
the point nL=mznH=2m,
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
nH=2m
 
. Since the memory of an
agent is made by two partitions, corresponding to the past
demands of the two classes of opponents, we can use two separated
simplexes to represent each one.
Most Frequent Persistent Regimes
If, following the approach in Axtell et al [1], we focus our
analysis on the transient dynamics of the spatial model, the
complexity of the system makes us to resort to computer
simulation as methodology. We have designed a set of experiments
Figure 2. Toroidal grid of 464 cells with 8 white and 8 black
agents distributed in the way shown. In this particular spatial
distribution the system may reach the IQ state in both intratype games
whenever similar tagged agents placed in the same column demand
exactly the complementary quantity (L or H) of their neighbours of
columns just next to them. This result is true if the intratype network is
bipartite, i.e. there are no odd-length cycles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g002
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to discover and understand the persistent regimes that emerge in
the model.
The parameterization of all cases mentioned in this paper
corresponds to a model of N = 100 agents randomly distributed in
a regular lattice of 2-dimensional grid of 10610 cells, each one
keeping one of the N agents. Each agent is endowed with two
memories of length 10 for intratype and intertype bargaining
games, initialized at random. In each time period t, each agent
selects one of her 8 neighbours (Moore neighbourhood) at random
and decides the best reply against the most frequent demand in her
memory for the type of opponent. However, with a small
probability e= 0.01 an agent decides randomly between the three
possible demands {L,M,H}. Note that each time period consists of
N matches, and consequently it is probable that an agent bargains
more than once in each time period. We have sampled 10.000
simulation runs during Tf = 30.000 time periods.
The system state at the end of the simulation time can be
summarized as a 3-tuple of the regimes reached by the intertype
and the two intratype bargaining games {Intra-whiteregime, Intra-
blackregime, Interregime}. Taking into account the characterization
of the types of stable and persistent regimes described in the
previous section, we may expect that if we let the system run for
long enough, it will reach one of the 33 possible combinations, i.e.
{EQ,EQ,EQ}, {EQ,EQ,FR}, …. We define a set of simple
conditions, henceforth C1 stop conditions, for reaching each of the
persistent regimes according to their nature: the EQ state is
considered reached whenever all agents in the corresponding
bargaining process have at least (12e)6m instances of M in their
memories (note that the memory vector has a finite number of
instances, so we approximate (12e)6m to the lower integer and
e6m to the higher integer), the IQ and the FR regime are
considered reached whenever all agents have at most e6m
instances of M and, moreover, in the case of the IQ state a group
of agents have (12e)6m instances of L and the rest have (12e)6m
of H, and in the case of FR all agents have a combination of
(12e)6m instances of both L and H. In short, a simulation run
stops when either it satisfies one of the C1 stop conditions or it
reaches the final time period Tf.
Figure 4 plots the frequency distribution of the stop conditions
reached by all simulations we run. As one may expect, the system
reaches one of the persistent regimes previously defined in the
majority of the cases (80.98% of the runs). A relevant result is that
Figure 3. 2-simplex representation of the state space used in
both intratype and intertype bargaining games. The shaded
regions correspond to the state subspaces in which an agent always
decides one of the three possible demands {L,M,H}. For example, the
light grey area at the bottom-left of the triangle represents a set of
states in which the majority of the items in the memory are L, and
therfore the agent will demand H. The opposite happens in the dark
grey area at the top. Finally the M demand dominates the agents’
memories in the white area, so the response of the agent in that area is
also M. Note that with the mode-decision rule, the centre of the
triangle, which is equidistant from the three vertices, corresponds to
the indifferent state in which any of the three demands is equally
possible.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g003
Figure 4. Frequency distribution of the stop conditions reached by 10.000 simulation runs. C1 represents the relative frequency of runs
that reached one of the C1 stop conditions defined in section ‘Most Frequent Persistent Regimes’. C2 represents the frequency of runs that reached
the C2 stop conditions defined in section ‘Isolated Bargaining Clusters’. This stop criterion extends the C1 conditions to disconnected interaction
components that can randomly appear in the spatial distribution of agents on the grid. Finally C3 gathers the rest of the runs, which are analysed in
section ‘Other Persistent Regimes’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g004
Mesoscopic Effects: ABM Model in Regular Lattices
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 March 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 3 | e17661
even when the assumption of regular spatial structure of
interaction, all the persistent regimes obtained in the global
interaction case are also reached. Figure 5 illustrates graphically
the most frequent states and regimes through a set of simplexes of
some representative runs. The regime is characterized by the
corresponding pair of simplexes of both intertype and intratype
bargaining. Some of these states can be interpreted from a social
perspective as a divided underclass oppressed by a unified elite, as
class distinctions, discriminatory regimes, etc. (see [1] for a deeper
insight on some interpretations).
Isolated Bargaining Clusters
Although the analysis of the simulation results described in the
previous section explains more than 80 percent, it still leaves out a
significant set of them. A preliminary visual exploration of some
anomalous cases gives us a possible answer: the presence of
disconnected groups of agents which play the bargaining game
isolated from other groups. In the initialization of the model,
agents are randomly distributed and consequently most of spatial
distribution samples have agents of both tags dispersed in the
lattice, but close enough to make the dynamics interdependent.
However, sometimes this randomness produces the formation of
two or more isolated groups, i.e. groups of agents who decide their
(intertype or intratype) demands without any direct or indirect
influence from the agents that belong to other groups. This
possibility had not been considered when we defined the C1 stop
conditions, so when this event happens the simulation may reach
the final time period if groups evolve to different regimes. It is
important to notice that the intratype and intertype interaction
networks are formed in the random initialization process and are
fixed until a stop criterion is reached. Other relevant research in
coevolving games does not assume fixed interaction networks but
instead the structure dynamically emerges as a consequence of the
game. Some of these coevolutionary rules have been used to model
Figure 5. Most frequent persistent regimes of the transient dynamics for the intertype and intratype bargaining games. The
bargaining between different groups (intertype) can reach the EQ state (top-left simplex), the IQ state (middle-left simplex) or the FR regime (bottom-
left simplex). In the bargaining within groups (intratype) we have shown the combination of {EQ,EQ} when both groups coordinate in the EQ state
(top-right simplex), {EQ,FR} when one group is in the EQ state but the other is in the FR regime (middle-right simplex), and when both groups stay in
the FR regime (bottom-right simplex).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g005
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mechanisms of learning [41], conditional dissociation [42],
unilateral and mutual choice in group dynamics [43,44],
reputation-based partner choice [45] or the formation and
deletion of strategy-independent links [46–48].
We illustrate these cases with one of the runs that exhibits this
type of spatial distribution (see Figure 6). In particular, the
example run has two disconnected white-tagged groups that reach
different final regimes. In order to discriminate this sort of cases we
define the C2 stop conditions which are exactly the same conditions
as C1 but applied at the level of disconnected groups -or
components, in the terminology of network theory that we will use
in the next section-, instead of at the level of the whole population,
as we do to define C1 conditions.
Introducing the C2 stop conditions, the number of runs that end
in some of the persistent regimes described so far increases until it
reaches more than 89 percent of them (see Figure 4). The
remaining set of runs, which end without reaching any of the
expected regimes, i.e. C3 stop conditions, are analysed in detail in
the next section.
Introducing the C2 stop conditions, the number of runs that end
in some of the persistent regimes described so far increases until it
reaches more than 89 percent of them (see Figure 4). The
remaining set of runs, which end without reaching any of the
expected regimes, i.e. C3 stop conditions, are analysed in detail in
the next section.
Other Persistent Regimes
The results above do not capture all persistent regimes in the
game. As evidence of intensive simulation in the spatial game with
random configurations, we find that there are still situations that
need a much longer time to stop with one of the two criteria (C1
and C2). This fact could suggest the appearance of some other
basins of attraction beyond the original AEY regimes that we have
found in section ‘Most Frequent Persistent Regimes’ and the
mentioned combinations of isolated states of section ‘Isolated
Bargaining Clusters’. This implies that there are additional
situations where the transient dynamics of the system differs from
the long-run behaviour of the system.
A visual inspection of the tag spatial distribution of these cases
puts forward some effects of the topology of interaction that could
explain additional regimes. This happens when there are
connected clusters of agents with the same tag who play different
types of intratype coordination in each of the clusters. The key
difference with the cases analysed in the previous section is that
such clusters are indeed connected.
It seems clear that the structure of interaction has an influence
on the game dynamics. We can consider the structure of intratype
interaction as an undirected network where each player represents
a node and there is a link between two nodes if both players can
play the intratype game (i.e. they are spatial neighbours and they
have the same tag). Our hypothesis is that the behaviour of the
system is affected by the topological properties in the mesoscale,
between the individual and the whole population, of this
underlying interaction network.
One of the most relevant mesoscopic characteristics in a network
is the property of community structure. Informally, a community in
a network consists of a subset of nodes that are relatively densely
connected to each other but sparsely connected to other dense
groups [49]. This type of local structure can be easily identified in a
variety of social contexts: families, friendship circles, virtual groups
in the Internet, neighbourhoods, etc. In fact, there is a very rich and
growing literature of networks that present community structure,
going from the networks of committee and subcommittee
assignments in the United States House of Representatives [50],
scientific collaboration networks [51], to networks of e-mail
interactions between university employees [52] or the collaboration
network of jazz musicians [53]. We presume that in connected
networks that present strong community structure, different
communities can reach different persistent regimes, and the spread
of one of the regimes to the whole connected group can be
obstructed if the inter-community connectivity is low.
We illustrate the intuition of this phenomenon in the following
idealized case. In Figure 7 we represent a certain configuration of
tags and the underlying intratype interaction network of white-
Figure 6. An example case that shows two disconnected
groups in the white tag intratype interaction network. Upper
figure: spatial distribution of agents with two disconnected groups
within white-tagged agents. Lower figure: the corresponding white tag
intratype interaction network in which the partition of the network is
easily seen (the 51–53 couple vs the rest of white agents). Although it
has not been mentioned, note that it is not difficult to identify two
other disconnected groups within black agents in this example (the 60–
89 couple vs the rest of the black agents).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g006
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tagged players. Intuitively there are two communities in the network
(depending on the algorithm used to identify communities, there
may be other partitions in communities different to the presented in
the example). If we play this game repeatedly a frequent result is
showed in Figure 8. Each community reaches a different regime,
stays trapped in it for a long time, and the diffusion of a general
homogeneous behaviour in the game is hindered.
If we want to extend these results to more general conditions in
the lattice game, we need to specify exactly how to define the
concept of community beyond the intuitive and vague idea of
some nodes very connected among them and sparsely linked with
other communities. As a matter of fact, the problem of detecting
communities is very challenging for two reasons: first, the number
of possible partitions is huge for non-trivial networks, and second,
but no less important, the concept (and hence the preferred
definition of communities) may be domain-specific, depending on
the field of application. Given this, it is not surprising that
nowadays there is a wide plethora of methods based on different
techniques and ideas to define and to identify communities in
networks (see some recent reviews in [49,54–57]).
Figure 7. Idealized case of white-tagged players and the underlying intratype interaction network. We have analysed the effects that
appear in the stylized configuration showed on the left of the figure. On the right, we represent the underlying interaction structure for the intratype
game of white-tagged players.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g007
Figure 8. Partition in communities of the idealized case and final regimes. On the right, we can observe two different persistent regimes in
the intratype game of white-tagged players depicted in Figure 7. The different regimes correspond exactly to the different communities showed on
the left.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g008
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In our analysis of the spread or lock-in of the persistent regimes,
the idealized case gives us a hint to select the identifying
community algorithm. We see that the edges that separate
communities act as bottlenecks that enable or put obstacles to
the flow of strategies. Based on this idea, Girvan and Newman [51]
defined the concept of betweenness of an edge generalizing the
concept of betweenness of a node by Freeman [58]. The
betweenness of an edge is calculated as the number of geodesic
(i.e. shortest) paths between node pairs that run through it,
normalized dividing by the number of pairs of nodes. The
betweenness of an edge gives us an idea of the importance of the
link to stop the flow of information in the network.
The algorithm of Girvan and Newman requires calculating the
betweenness of all edges in the network and removing the one with
the highest betweenness, repeating the whole process until no
edges remain (in case of tie, one can be randomly removed, or all
can be simultaneously removed). The logic of the algorithm is
based on the idea that the edges connecting communities will have
comparatively high betweenness and hence, by removing them
iteratively, we will separate the different components of the
network that reveal the hidden community structure of the graph.
The result of this algorithm is a dendrogram where horizontal
cross-sections represent different possible community divisions,
depending on the desired number of communities. Since the
method does not provide the appropriate number of communities
to split the network, the same authors [59] proposed to evaluate
the divisions using the concept of modularity as the fitness
function. The modularity of a partition is an index that aims to
quantify how good a partition is. Partitions with high values of
modularity are those in which there are dense internal connections
between the nodes within clusters but only sparse connections
between different clusters. Modularity compares the number of
links inside a community with the expected number of links that
one would find in the community if the network were randomly
generated keeping the degree of every node (i.e. the number of
links), but linking them randomly. Following Newman [60], the
modularity Q of an unweighted and undirected network
partitioned into communities can be computed as:
Q~
X
i
eii{b
2
i
  ð1Þ
where eii denotes the fraction of all edges that have both ends in
community i, and bi is the fraction of edges that have one or two
ends in community i.
Given that this algorithm to partition the network formalizes the
idea of information flow, we hypothesize that some additional
persistent regimes can appear when each community adopts a
coordinated regime except for potentially some border agents with
other communities that can present a fluctuating behaviour
depending on the community with which they play, and hence
act as bottlenecks for the diffusion of norms between communities.
In order to check our hypothesis we have analysed the instances
where simulations have not reached any of the persistent regimes
considered in the previous sections: the simulations that stopped
because they reached the final time period Tf, i.e. stop condition
C3. In each one of these cases we have recorded the final state of
each player in the intratype game according to the definitions of
section ‘Isolated Bargaining Clusters’. If the agent did not reach
any of the predefined states based on her memory, we classify her
as ‘‘regime not established’’.
In those games, we have also exported the topology of each
component of the underlying intratype interaction network and
applied the Girvan-Newman algorithm maximizing the modularity to
identify the different communities. We can compare the partition given
by the algorithm with the final behavioural state of the players in the
game. If the mesoscopic topology conditions the spread and diffusion of
strategies in the lattice, the state of the players should be homogeneous
in each community except for potentially some nodes that are at the
border of the community. We define a node as border in a community
if she has a link to another player that belongs to a different
community. When two connected communities stabilize in a different
regime, the agents that are at the border should present a flipping
strategy, as a consequence of their exposure to different regimes. In
fact, given the construction of the Girvan-Newman algorithm, the
interaction of an agent that is at the border of a community with the
neighbour community is done by means of links of high betweenness.
In general, the frequency of interaction of those agents with players in
the neighbour community is going to be lower than with players in
their own community. In terms of diffusion of regimes this fact is
crucial, since in order to change their strategy they would need to play
very often with players from the other communities, which is against
the chances imposed by the topology. Agents at the border act as
buffers and stabilizers of the diffusion of regimes.
Figure 9. Number of components analysed that have a given percentage of explained nodes (i.e. nodes that have a homogeneous
strategy with their communities, or border nodes with a different strategy to that in their community).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0017661.g009
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In the 1007 components from simulations that finished with the
C3 criterion, we have computed the number of nodes that have a
homogeneous strategy with the community where they belong,
and the number of border players that have a different behaviour.
The number of nodes in this category accounts for 91.7%. We
represent in Figure 9 the percentage of nodes explained in the final
state of the 1007 components.
Our community analysis of the 1007 networks has identified
6,366 communities. We have also computed the number of players
within a community proposed by the algorithm that have a
discordant behaviour according to our hypothesis. Results are
presented in Figure 10. As we can see more than 60% of the
communities have exactly the expected behaviour.
The 8% of nodes that present a strategy discordant with the
expected behaviour can be explained by different reasons. First of
all, it is important to notice that the model is stochastic, and hence
some randomness is going to be present. This randomness may
introduce important inertia in the analysis of the state of the players.
Another factor could be that we are stopping the simulations after
30 000 ticks, which for some complex topologies may be insufficient
to converge to a complete persistent regime. Apart from that, we
should keep in mind that the topologies analysed are obtained from
complete random initialization of agents in the lattice which may
produce strange topologies. The partition in communities of such
topologies can be different depending on the algorithm used. The
Girvan-Newman algorithm is very appealing to explain diffusion
processes because it is based on a centrality measure but other
algorithms are better at maximizing the modularity [54]. It is
possible, therefore, that other algorithms give us other partitions
that improve the explanation based on the Girvan-Newman
algorithm. In any case, this study has shown the significant effect
of the mesoscopic interaction structure in the spatial diffusion of
strategies of the game in the lattice.
Discussion
In this work we have addressed the effect of a regular spatial
structure on the Nash bargaining game in a finite population of
tagged agents. We have showed that all the transient regimes
proposed by Axtell et al [1] can also be present in the lattice game.
More interestingly, depending on the particular tag distribution of
agents through the grid we have found some topological properties
that explain the diffusion of the agent’s strategies in the lattice. We
have showed that isolated clusters of intra or inter type of interaction
can reach different persistent regimes. Moreover, we have proved
the influence of the topology in understanding new stable regimes
different from those found by Axtell et al [1]. To explain their
appearance and persistence, we have based our analysis on the
mesoscopic properties of the interaction structure, concretely in the
community structure of the network of interaction. Using the
Girvan-Newman algorithm based on the edge betweenness and the
concept of modularity to identify communities, we can understand
the behaviour of many of the nodes of the simulation that do not
reach any of the previous described regimes. Although the results
can be dependent on the rules of the game, they may explain the
emergence of different norms of economic interaction and resource
allocation among different spatial groups, not only if the groups are
isolated and do not communicate among them, but also if the
interaction among groups has community structure.
The findings of these mesoscopic effects in a property distribution
game strongly corroborate the relevance of the arguments
previously exposed by authors like Lozano et al. [24,25] in the
evolutionary Prisoner’s Dilemma, Roca et al. [61] and Tomassini
and Pestelacci [62] in cooperation dilemmas, and similar phenom-
ena also described by Castello´ et al. [63,64] in the context of
dynamical models of competing options. Although the game played
on the spatial substrate is different from the games explored by these
authors, the mechanism that prevents the homogenization of a
general strategy in the population is very similar. They use the idea
of topological traps [61,63,64] (i.e. links between nodes of different
degrees in regions with few or no redundant paths) to explain why
‘‘homogeneous strategy waves’’ do not propagate over the network
uniformly. Since we are partitioning the network using a
methodology based on the concept of betweenness, we are indirectly
detecting the notion of topological traps in the borders between
communities, as our results show.
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